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Abstract 
 
This study examines the evolution of the automotive industry in Brazil and its key drivers. We argue that the rules 
of the game – industry policies – are an outcome of exchanges between the host government and industry. These 
arise from changes in economic and political environments and interdependence between industry and the 
country’s economy. To this end, we draw upon literature on institutions and co-evolution to understand the industry 
footprint over a 50-year period, as well as its relationship with changes in government policies. This study 
generates new insights on institutional and co-evolution political perspectives by showing that the rules of the 
game are not only the making of the government, but are also the result of interdependencies between industry and 
government.  
 
Key words: co-evolution; government–industry interaction; emerging markets; automotive industry; rules of the 
game.  
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Introduction 
 
 
The literature on international business has largely demonstrated how host country institutions, 
through the actions of their governments, can influence multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) choice of 
location (Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatochev, 2014), mode of entry (Henisz & Zelner, 2005), and performance 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009). In turn, home country government institutions, through formal and 
informal mechanisms, can foster the internationalization process of national MNEs (Bazuchi, Zacharias, 
Broering, Arreola, & Bandeira-de-Mello, 2013; Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  
The political intricacies in relationships between MNEs and (host and home) governments (or the 
influence one side exerts over another) have chiefly been examined in by corporate political activity 
(CPA) literature (Bazuchi et al., 2013; Fernandes, Bandeira-de-Mello, & Zanni, 2012). Rajwani and 
Liedong (2015), showing that CPA adds value to the firm. Nevertheless, firm choices and political 
strategies are conditioned by the institutional environment. For instance, in contexts of institutional 
weakness, which are typical in emerging economies, these political strategies may be better understood 
through the concepts of social capital and political connections. From a broader theoretical viewpoint, 
Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani (2013) argue that institutional theory can contribute in two ways to our 
understanding of CPA: firstly, “it can give an account of how different political, social and economic 
arrangements affect firm–government relations”; secondly, at the firm level, institutional theory can 
help us “to understand how firms adapt (or not) to alterations and evolution in the non-market 
environment” (p. 92). The latter issue, as the authors argue, is particularly important in emerging 
markets, “where economic development can place traditional institutional arrangements under strain” 
because “the evolution of a political system can present incumbent firms with difficulties, as their 
previous CPA is rendered less effective in the new context” (Lawton, McGuire, & Rajwani, p. 96). For 
these authors, a question that remains and must be further explored relates to understanding non-market 
activity in emerging economies. These prior studies on the relationships between institutions and firms, 
including MNEs, have empirically and theoretically illuminated how CPA can affect firm outcomes due 
to government regulations. In spite of the relevance of this literature in clarifying the political arena in 
which business and government interact, and how this interaction affects firm performance, they do not 
focus on the process of institution-building over long periods of time.  
These studies have also looked more closely at the firm level than others, such as industry. In our 
study, we analyze how governments in emerging economies interact with local industries. The choice 
of industry as a unit of analysis is due to a number of reasons. First, government regulation does not 
address individual firms, but a collection of firms that are similar in the type of business or segment in 
which they operate. Second, firms in the same sector tend to respond isomorphically by imitating the 
practices and strategies of peers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Third, in some 
emerging economies such as Brazil, the state played a critical role in fostering the development of 
several industrial sectors, with business and governments maintaining close relationships. This closeness 
translates into large government subsidies and protection (Schneider, 2015). Fourth, the interaction 
between industry and successive governments of developmental states over time brings to the fore an 
issue that contributes to our understanding of the process of institution-building – that is, the 
interdependence between industry and a country’s economy – and, more precisely, between industry 
outcomes and a country’s economic performance. We argue that interdependence is a key driver of the 
co-evolutionary process, particularly regarding the definition of the rules of the game.   
Drawing on institution and industrial policy literature, our research investigates how institutions, 
which are “the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction” (North, 2001, p. 248), 
come into being and influence the strategic choices and performance of the Brazilian automotive 
industry. More specifically, we look at formal industry constraints, such as the rules of the game (e.g., 
government regulations and policies). We understand rules of the game to mean actions and policies 
by governments that attract and regulate the development of an industry. We also analyze how these 
formal institutions change over time because, as North (1990) argues, “institutional change is shaped by 
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(i) the lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the organizations that 
have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by those institutions” (p. 7).  
Our purpose is to analyze institution-building within the context of a developmental state. As 
Scott (2008) states,  
attention has been devoted to how institutions affect the structure and functioning of 
organizations, organizational populations, or organizational fields, but much less to understand 
how institutions are constructed, the actors implicated in this process, forces by which new types 
of institutions emerge and the mechanisms by which they are crafted (p. 93). 
 Our purpose is to analyze institution-building within the context of an emerging economy where 
the state was a critical force for industrial development, and where interdependence can be seen as a 
mechanism that drove the rules of the game defined by the state. 
Given that industrial policies vary within and across political mandates and economic 
circumstances in host countries, we used a co-evolutionary perspective to construct a framework that 
explains the context and mechanisms by which the rules of the game emerge and change. Even though 
most co-evolutionary studies have focused on individual firms and how they relate to their meso 
(industry) and macro (institutional) environments, some recent co-evolution studies have focused on the 
industry level (Breznitz, 2007; Funk, 2009; Murmann, 2013). These studies have sought to clarify how 
the interaction between government and industry over time can affect industry outcomes and explain 
government policy effectiveness – or, in the case of Murmann’s study (2013), causal mechanisms that 
drive co-evolution.  
Moreover, by examining the dynamics driving and shaping the interaction between government 
policies and industry strategies, our main aim is to advance a political perspective of co-evolution (Child, 
Tse, & Rodrigues, 2013; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Rodrigues & Child, 2003). The economic and 
political volatility exhibited in the history of emerging markets renders industry–institution co-
evolutions an important and attractive subject for research. Yet, with a few exceptions (Child et al., 
2013; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Rodrigues & Child, 2003), this has been somewhat overlooked in the 
co-evolution literature up to now. Such a perspective draws attention to the intentionality and importance 
of power of relevant actors. Since firms and other actors have their own interests, they consciously drive 
co-evolutionary processes through certain initiatives (Child et al., 2013). Our intent is to expand a 
political approach by looking at another aspect: how high or low interdependence affects the interaction 
between industry and government and, thus, the rules of the game defined by the latter for the former.  
This study examines the Brazilian automotive industry and addresses the role of interdependence 
in the co-evolution of government and industry strategies. We selected the automotive industry for 
analysis due to four reasons: (a) usually this industry engages in CPA (Eden & Molot, 2002; Sun, 
Mellahi, & Wright, 2012; Zhao, Anand, & Mitchell, 2005); (b) the Brazilian automotive industry is 
entirely foreign owned (Shapiro, 1994); (c) the automotive industry is perceived as having a high degree 
of legitimacy due to its historical role in the country’s industrialization process – automobiles have been 
at the center of Brazilian industrial policy for more than 50 years (Financial Times, 2013); and (d) the 
importance that the automotive segment has for the Brazilian economy as a whole – the sector, on 
average, has accounted for 15% of Brazilian industrial GDP over the last two decades. This importance 
has led, as Schapiro (2017) contends, to the automotive industry being a permanent client of different 
government incentive schemes, regardless of their ideological orientation.  
We examine the industry’s footprint and changes in industrial policies over a 50-year period. In 
this longitudinal case study on the Brazilian automotive industry, we develop a conceptual framework 
that recognizes interdependencies and interest-based exchanges; the nature of outcomes – the rules of 
the game; and industry choices regarding production, technology, and trade. In particular, this study 
examines how these rules emerged and changed over time as well as their effect on the performance of 
the automotive industry. Through a co-evolutionary perspective, we unveil how the evolution of political 
and economic contexts over five decades has led to more or less interdependence between the 
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automotive industry and Brazilian economy, thus affecting reciprocal adjustments and the definition and 
change of rules. By doing so, we advance a political co-evolution perspective by drawing attention to 
the role of interdependence as a driver of the process.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce a co-evolution perspective and 
how it throws light on the abovementioned issues. Second, we discuss how the rules of the game and 
politics are interrelated in emerging economies. We then explain the methods used. A section on findings 
explores the mutual effects of government and industry strategies and the outcomes of this process in 
different economic and political challenges. The final section integrates our findings on four periods of 
industry co-evolution and provides research conclusions. 
 
 
A Political View of Industry Co-evolution  
 
 
Co-evolution has opened avenues to explore how interdependent actors – organizations, 
industries, and institutions – mutually influence each other and to understand how these economic 
entities develop interactively over time (Child, Rodrigues, & Tse, 2012; Rodrigues & Child, 2008). Co-
evolutionary analysis requires an examination of the interaction between organizations (micro level) and 
their immediate (meso level) or broader (macro level) environments.  
Research on different industries – such as synthetic dye (Murmann, 2013), oil (Dantas & Bell, 
2011), film (Lampel & Shamsie, 2003), financial services (Flier, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2003), 
music (Huygens, Van den Bosch, Volberda, & Baden-Fuller, 2001), and fashion (Djelic & Ainamo, 
1999) – has helped to explain how “environmental transformation and organizational change interact 
over time and feed on each other” (Djelic & Ainamo, 1999, p. 622). More precisely, research has 
explained the interaction between, on the one hand, “internal processes such as the variation and 
replication of routines, capabilities, competencies and, on the other, industry-level competitive dynamics 
and selection” (Lewin & Koza, 2001, p. vi). Thus, industry capabilities may be understood as “systemic 
properties that result from the behavior of firms acting to improve their position within this ecology by 
searching for new practices and routines” (Lampel & Shamsie, 2003, p. 2206). These studies have 
provided information on the role of managerial intentionality within firm adaption processes (Lewin & 
Volberda, 1999) and, specifically, the evolution process: firms’ adaptation to their environments through 
learning (Child et al., 2013).  
Other studies have sought to extend our understanding of the dynamics of co-evolution between 
organizations (micro) and institutions (macro) (Child et al., 2012, 2013; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; 
Rodrigues & Child, 2003) and between industries (meso) and institutions (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; 
Breznitz, 2007; Flier et al., 2003; Funk, 2009; Hoffman, 1999; Jain & Sharma, 2013; Murmann, 2013). 
Both approaches appreciate the value of environments, historical legacies, institutional contexts of 
countries in shaping organizations’ trajectories, and their structural evolution over time (Djelic & 
Ainamo, 1999). Nevertheless, organizations may perform the role of institutional entrepreneurs and 
proactively change their environments (Child, Lu, & Tsai, 2007; Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). A similar 
point in these studies is the assumption that while firms respond to institutional environments, they also 
change these environments. Some examples include entrepreneurial firms in Russia (Ahlstrom & 
Bruton, 2010), a container terminal in China (Child et al., 2013), and the mobile industry in India (Jain 
& Sharma, 2013).  
In addition, these Russian, Chinese, and Indian cases have shown that the co-evolutionary 
dynamics of influence in emerging economies may not have the same pattern as in developed economies, 
which typically have freer markets (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010; Child et al., 2012; Dieleman & Sachs, 
2008; Jain & Sharma, 2013; Rodrigues & Child, 2003). Emerging economies are characterized by rapid 
shifts in institutional environments (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2010), a lack of institutional stability, and 
institutional weakness (Rodrigues & Child, 2008). They are also characterized by deep political ties 
between corporations and institutions (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Fernandes et al., 2012; Sun et al., 
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2012), hierarchical structures (Schneider, 2009), and network capitalism (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 
2014), in which firm strategies are defined by cozy relationships with the state rather than by market 
relationships. 
The roles of politics and power within co-evolutionary processes have been empirically analyzed, 
establishing the foundations for building a political view of co-evolution. Rodrigues and Child (2003), 
who examine the case of a state-owned Brazilian telecommunications firm (Telemig) within a highly 
institutionalized environment, argue that “senior managers are able to influence the institutional 
environment – and therefore the competitive regime – by holding positions that allow them to engage 
in political actions that redefine regulatory boundaries [among others]” (p. 2160). Later, Dieleman and 
Sachs (2008) examine the case of Indonesia’s Salim Group. The influence of this family-owned business 
over local institutions was possible because it “was embedded in the Suharto regime, and through its 
connections was able to modify its external environment to fit its own needs” (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008, 
p. 1297). Finally, more recently, by analyzing the case of China’s Yantian International Container 
Terminals (YICT), which, like Telemig, operates within a context characterized by a high level of 
government intervention, Child, Rodrigues and Tse (2012) advanced a co-evolution political perspective 
by discussing how intentionality and power resources of relevant actors create possibilities for them to 
influence co-evolution. Their argument is that “co-evolution takes place not only through learning, but 
significantly through the use of power and influence” (Child et al., 2012, p. 1247). 
These studies shed light on issues such as the dynamics of co-evolution and, in particular, the 
construction of institutions. One issue is institutional endogeneity – the possibility that institutions can 
be influenced by organizations (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008). This is particularly important in emerging 
economies, in which leading firms are often in a position to advance governments’ interests (such as 
support for education and other social programs) in return for flexibility in how regulations apply to 
them (Child et al., 2013). Another issue is the political nature of the interaction of firms, the government, 
and institutions (Rodrigues & Child, 2008), which is an important aspect to examine in co-evolutionary 
dynamics.  
Two aspects have been disregarded in this political view of co-evolution. First, focus has been on 
corporate co-evolution, so the unit of analysis is the firm. Previous studies have analyzed micro 
(organization) and macro (institutional) interactions by examining the cases of three single firms 
(Telemig in Brazil, the Salim Group in Indonesia, and YICT in China). In the present study, we focus 
on the interaction between meso (industry) and macro (institutional) levels, examining how the result of 
their interaction – the rules of the game – is influenced by their interdependencies. In some 
developmental states in East Asia and Latin America, the state played an active role in fostering the 
development of chosen industries. The development of these industries, such as the automotive in Brazil, 
was marked by certain features: reciprocity (subsidies in exchange for improved performance) and 
collaborative relations between government and business (Schneider, 2015). As co-evolution theory 
suggest, these relationships create path dependence, setting the basis for the type of interdependence 
governments and industry develop.  
Second, a political perspective draws attention to intentionality and power resources of relevant 
actors as drivers of the co-evolutionary process (Child et al., 2013); however, it has overlooked the role 
of interdependence in co-evolution dynamics. As industries evolve and become more important within 
a country’s economy, their interests can become closely linked to those of governments. This 
interdependence, which is well illustrated by the Brazilian automotive industry (Schapiro, 2017), may 
have effects on how the rules of the game are defined and change over time. Institution-building is thus 
path dependent, reflecting reciprocity and collaborative relations between business and government 
(Schneider, 2015) or the lock-in suggested by North (1990). It also reflects more circumstantial 
interdependences, which vary according to economic and political contexts. We therefore argue that in 
addition to intentionality and power resources of relevant actors, a political perspective should draw 
attention to interdependence as a driver of co-evolution between industry and institutions in 
developmental states.  
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Defining the Rules of the Game in Emerging Economies 
 
 
Institutions are defined as formal and informal rules of the game (North, 1990). Rules govern the 
interactions of actors – MNEs, domestic firms, civil society groups, and government bodies – and 
determine the organization of economic activities (Fligstein, 2001). Although the effects of institutions 
on organizations have been widely analyzed from different theoretical perspectives, less attention 
has been devoted to how institutions affect the structure and functioning of organizations, 
organizational populations, or organizational fields, but much less to understand how institutions 
are constructed, the actors implicated in this process, forces by which new types of institutions 
emerge and the mechanisms by which they are crafted (Scott, 2008, p. 93). 
Understanding how actors play the game of defining rules is, however, not so simple given the 
different forces at play (Biggart & Guillén, 1999; Nelson, 1995; Rodrigues & Child, 2008). Stopford 
(1994) asserts that, 
the rules of the game are determined by the outcomes of a three-way tug of war: domestic political 
imperatives pull one way; international economic imperatives can pull in another; and the firms’ 
global competitive imperatives can add a third dimension (p. 54). 
As North (1990) states, “institutions are not necessarily or even usually created to be socially 
efficient; rather they, or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those with the 
bargaining power to devise new rules” (p. 16). The strength (or power) of each way pulling against the 
others is highly contextual, so there tends to be a difference between developed markets and emerging 
economies. In the latter context, characterized by the absence of strong institutions (Lawton et al., 2013), 
powerful actors are more likely to engage in political behavior to protect their interests. In reality, the 
institutional context “influences the political strategies used by firms, the performance outcomes of those 
strategies, and the mechanisms through which those strategies affect performance outcomes” (Rajwani 
& Liedong, 2015, p. 274).  
Government–firm relationships are embedded in historical and structural conditions that prevailed 
at the time of an industry’s inception (Schneider, 2009). An example is the way in which countries 
developed their political and economic regimes. Industrialization in emerging markets in Asia and Latin 
America followed a model of development in which relationships between the state and private firms 
were central. Local governments defined policies that shaped their countries’ relationships to the global 
economy and affected the domestic allocation of resources in industries and major social groups 
(Gereffi, 1990; Schneider, 2015). In order to leverage industrialization, emerging economy governments 
used several strategies to attract foreign capital in order to subsidize the development of more 
technologically sophisticated industries. These strategies gave rise to a debate about the “relative power 
of foreign actors and Third World governments in determining rules for investment and the distribution 
of benefits” (Stallings, 1990, p. 55).  
In the particular case of Brazil, industrialization was leveraged by the state, MNEs, and local 
capital (Evans, 1979). The role played by economic agents during certain phases varied. When there 
was an attempt between the mid-1950s and mid-1960s to substitute capital – and technology-intensive 
products, such as automobiles, electrical and non-electrical machinery, petrochemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals – MNEs played a major role in the process. As industrialization proceeded, a new 
structure of power was established. State-owned firms, along with MNEs and large-scale private firms, 
dominated the Brazilian industrial regime in this period (Kaufman, 1990). Assessments of the 
development of MNEs in Brazil (Grosse, 2013; Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-de-Mello, & Marcon, 
2015; Schneider, 2009; Stallings, 1990) have suggested that government–business relationships played 
a central role given the state’s multiple roles as a competitor, supplier, and regulator (Grosse, 2013). 
Schneider (2009) argues that in Latin America, relationships between the state and firms were shaped 
by hierarchical capitalism, in which the value of market rules varied with the political preferences of 
those in power. Even in regimes in which market relationships were of some value, such relationships 
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predominated until the state decided to interfere in a way that was beneficial to its political interests. 
Although the role of the state can diminish in pro-market governments, they often decide to recover 
their historical roles (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & Ramaswamy, 2014).  
Despite acknowledging the political dimension of the relationship between MNEs and 
institutional environments (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994), this approach downplays the relationship 
between industry and the government. A host government certainly deals with individual organizations, 
but some industries are highly concentrated, with only a few relevant actors and, thus, interaction 
between industry and the government deserves attention. This approach also overlooks how 
relationships with governments and institutions evolve over time, especially regarding changes to, and 
the definition of, the rules of the game. Neglect of the processual characteristic of the definition of rules 
may overlook the “messy political facets that characterize institutional change” (Jain & Sharma, 2013, 
p. 253). These facets are even more important in emerging economies, where the interplay between 
politics and institutions is more obvious (Meyer & Peng, 2016; Rodrigues & Child, 2008) but still not 
entirely clear (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). Nevertheless, we can unveil how the co-evolution of macro 
and meso elements occurs through the use of power and influence (Child et al., 2012). Interdependencies 
between industry and national economies deserve further analysis, particularly how structural 
interdependence, which is path dependent, can be complemented by a more circumstantial 
interdependence that can vary with shifts in economic and political contexts. 
Governments define regulations for the entire economy as well as specific industries. Industrial 
policies are usually associated with longer-term government plans aimed at creating and fostering the 
development of a particular industry. Complementarily, some rules of the game are more flexible and 
circumstantial as they can be granted or suspended at any time. Thus, they are more susceptible to 
political, economic, as well as to ideological shifts. In this study, we examine tax incentives (in different 
schemes) that governments may give to industries considered more important in leveraging economic 
development. Thus, from an institutional viewpoint, the definition of some rules may be more open to 
the influence of certain immediate economic and political circumstances; and such rules may also be 
less structural, stable, and easier to change. These circumstances are, nevertheless, moderated by lock-
in, which is a consequence of “the incentive structure provided by ... institutions” (North, 1990, p. 7).  
 
 
Methods 
 
 
To discuss the co-evolution process of industry and institutions’ strategies, as well as the 
outcomes (the rules of the game) resulting from this interaction, we analyze the Brazilian automotive 
industry from a historical perspective. An essential characteristic of co-evolutionary studies is their 
historical and longitudinal approach (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Murmann, 2013; Rodrigues & Child, 
2003). A longitudinal perspective is key in understanding how disruptive events, such as, economic 
downturns and new government regimes, give rise to new rules that govern industry. Although co-
evolution studies have typically used longitudinal studies, less attention has been paid to the role of 
disruptive events in the evolution of the rules of the game. One exception is the work of Hoffman (1999), 
who analyzes how these events lead to a reconfiguration of the institutions guiding organizations’ 
behavior. Prior studies on co-evolution have argued that identification of macro disruptions are key to 
capture changes that occur at a different level of analysis (Lewin & Volberda, 1999) – a research strategy 
that we used in this research that is explained below in this section. 
We analyzed, over a 50-year period (1964–2014), the development of the Brazilian automotive 
industry in periods of high and low economic growth and under different political regimes. This division 
followed major national political and economic events. The first phase (1964–1974) starts with the 
military coup and ends around the world oil crisis. This period was characterized by rapid economic 
growth, which was destabilized by the oil crisis and balance of payments deficit. The second phase 
(1975–1989) covers a period of deep economic crisis (debt crisis, high inflation, and low economic 
growth) and ends with the return of democracy around 1990. The subsequent phase (1990–2002) is 
Co-Evolution of Industry Strategies and Government Policies  9 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 14, n. 2, art. 5, e160100, 2017   www.anpad.org.br/bar  
marked by economic stabilization, privatization, higher economic growth, freer trade policies, and 
increased exports and ends with the ascension of the Workers’ Party to power in 2003. The last phase 
(2003–2014) is characterized by a boom in consumption and an increasingly favorable international 
economic environment. Table 1 presents an overview of the four phases.  
Table 1 
Brazil’s Political and Economic Context (1964–2014) 
 Phase I 
(1964–1974) 
Phase II 
(1975–1989) 
Phase III 
(1990–2002) 
Phase IV 
(2003–2014) 
Political Context 
– Democratic 
regime 
– Political 
instability 
– Military regime 
– End of the 
military regime 
– President directly 
elected in 1989 
 
– Presidents 
directly elected 
– Impeachment of 
President Collor 
– Consolidation of 
democracy 
– Political stability 
– Ascension of the 
Workers’ Party 
 
Economic 
Context 
– Higher economic 
growth 
– Oil crisis 
– Trade deficit 
– Deep economic 
crisis  
– high inflation and 
recession 
(stagflation) 
– Debt crisis 
– Freer trade 
policies 
– Economic 
stabilization 
– Mercosur 
– Higher economic 
growth 
– Consumption boom 
– Favorable 
international conditions 
Note. Source: Compiled by the authors. 
The main data source used in our longitudinal study was the online achieve of O Estado de São 
Paulo (ESP). We collected macroeconomic data, such as economic growth, inflation, and interest rates, 
from the Central Bank of Brazil (Banco Central do Brasil [BACEN]) and the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [IBGE]). For information on 
the automotive industry’s performance, we gathered data on production, foreign trade, and technology. 
This was mainly from annual reports published by the National Association of Vehicle Manufacturers 
(Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos Automotores [ANFAVEA]). In addition, we studied 
academic documents (books, dissertations, theses, research reports) on the industry. All these data 
sources were used to examine the historical evolution of the industry, although some had a specific 
purpose related to our framework. For example, we used reports from the IBGE, BACEN, and 
ANFAVEA to make sense of macro changes and newspaper articles to identify changes in government–
industry relationships and the rules of the game (see Table 2). 
Table 2  
Data Analysis 
Category Source Insights obtained from sources 
Document analysis 
IBGE , BACEN, and ANFAVEA 
reports 
Economic performance 
 
Industry performance 
Media analysis 
O Estado de São Paulo (online 
archive) 
Political and economic context 
 
Basis of exchange between 
government and the industry 
 
Rules of the game (incentives and 
constraints) 
Note. Source: Compiled by the authors. 
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We carried out media analysis to make sense of changes over time in the macro environment, the 
rules of the game, and industry responses. However, sources are not exempt from limitations: 
newspapers are not free from ideology and distortion cannot be ignored. Thus, we discarded opinion 
articles, such as editorials. Despite these shortcomings, using newspapers as a source in longitudinal 
studies has several advantages. First, newspapers traditionally attempt to cover all the different sides 
involved when approaching an issue. Second, newspapers allow the evolution of political and economic 
contexts to be followed over a long period of time, which is important when the goal is to understand 
the dynamics of interdependencies of co-evolving entities. We focused on one newspaper, ESP, which 
is a major national daily Brazilian newspaper, founded in 1875. This newspaper’s entire archive is 
available online. 
By entering the keywords indústria automotiva (automotive industry) into the online ESP archive, 
we obtained 14,000 articles for the period between 1900 and 2014. Given that analyzing all these articles 
would be time and cost intensive, and because we were interested in associating clear changes in macro-
economic and political environments and shifts in government policies related to the performance of the 
automotive industry, we conducted a detailed qualitative analysis only for the years in which we 
observed great reductions in GDP growth. In Phase I, for example, this occurred in 1974 when GDP 
growth was 8.2%, falling from 14% in the previous year. For the analysis of Phase II, we focused on 
1981, when GDP growth was -4.3%, falling from 3.2% in 1980. For the analysis of Phase III, we focused 
on 1990, when GDP growth was -4.3%, falling from 3.2% in 1989. Finally, in Phase IV, we analyzed 
2009, when GDP growth was -0.1%, falling from 5.1% in 2008. Within each period, we focused on the 
years of greater economic shrinkage because economic downturns are likely to lead to both industry and 
government responses in overcoming the effects of crisis. Table 3 presents the years to be analyzed. 
 
Table 3 
 
Years to Be Analyzed (in Bold) 
 
Phase Year GDP growth 
Phase I (1964–1974) 
1973 14.0% 
1974 8.2% 
1975 5.2% 
Phase II (1975–1989) 
1980 3.2% 
1981 -4.3% 
1982 0.8% 
Phase III (1990–2002) 
1989 3.2% 
1990 -4.3% 
1991 1.0% 
Phase IV (2003–2014) 
2008 5.1% 
2009 -0.1% 
2010 7.5% 
Note. Source: Compiled by the authors. 
After defining the years to be analyzed, we proceeded with the archival data collection. Table 4 
below summarizes the number of articles analyzed in each selected year. 
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Table 4 
 
Number of Articles Analyzed (Per Year) 
 
Phase Number of ESP articles 
Phase I (1974) 223 
Phase II (1981) 363 
Phase III (1990) 236 
Phase IV (2009) 166 
Note. Source: Compiled by the authors. 
The reading of all selected articles led to the inclusion of subjects that related to our categories of 
analysis. First, we considered the economic and political context of each analysis period, selecting those 
events that were most enduring and representative of each phase so as to make sense of co-evolution. 
This was followed by the choice of paragraphs whose content addressed the analysis categories (e.g., 
the rules of the game) and related processes, such as industry–government relationships, 
interdependencies between these actors, and disputes and compromises between them. Finally, we 
examined the industry’s performance (production, foreign trade, and technology) by drawing upon 
industry reports, such as those specified previously in this section. Table 5 summarizes the categories 
of analysis. 
 
Table 5  
 
Analysis Categories 
 
Political Context 
Political regime 
(democratic and non-democratic) 
Government–business relationship 
Developmental state 
(Evans, 1979; Gereffi, 1990; 
Schneider, 2009, 2015) 
Economic Context 
Economic growth rate 
Automotive industry’s share of 
industrial GDP increased   
Government intervention 
(incentives, subsidy and protection)  
(Lazzarini et al., 2015; Schapiro, 
2017) 
Basis of exchange between 
government and industry 
Government priorities 
Industry priorities 
Co-evolution political perspective 
(Child et al., 2013; Dieleman & 
Sachs, 2008; Rodrigues & Child, 
2008) 
Outcomes of industry–
government exchange 
Convergence of interests 
Rules of the game 
Institutional construction 
(interests and interdependence) 
(Fligstein, 2001; North, 1990; Scott, 
2008) 
Note. Source: The authors. 
In order to make sense of the industry through macro variables and the role of the rules of the 
game in the studied years (1974, 1981, 1990, 2009), we took the GDP performance (economic growth 
compared to the immediate years before and after) and industry performance (automotive production 
compared to the immediate years before and after, and the contribution of the industry within industrial 
GDP) as a reference and explored the underlying motivations of both sides in making their respective 
demands and responses. In particular, we investigated how the rules of the game were set up or changed 
following these demands. Even though a causality relationship “demonstrates that variable x leads to 
outcome y, and that y was not caused spuriously by a third variable z” (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 
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2008, p. 1466) – and is a key feature of case study internal or “logical validity” – we acknowledge that 
this relationship is explained more by “loops than by lines” (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 270). Our rich dataset 
allowed us to move beyond causal homogeneity (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-
Mäntymäki, 2011). In this study, we used the unique opportunities offered by longitudinal research to 
“reveal multiple sources and loops of causation and connectivity” (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 271); or as Jones 
and Khanna (2008) state, environments change and so relationships between variables change, and, thus, 
understanding these changes matters. To make sense of the relationships between the macro and meso 
variables, we relied on different iterations and triangulation of information, a measure to enhance 
construct validity (Gibbert et al., 2008). Consensus between the authors was reached in data 
interpretation and for the whole analysis. 
 
 
Findings 
 
 
In this section, we present the details of the automotive industry through its macro environment 
and the resulting rules of the game by describing the political and economic context of each phase. The 
conditions that led to the development and performance of the industry are also highlighted. Table 6 
displays GDP growth and the industry’s importance in each period.  
 
Table 6 
 
GDP Growth and Industry’s Relevance 
 
Phase Year GDP growth 
 Automotive industry’s 
share of industrial 
GDP   
Phase I (1964–1974) 
1973 14.0% 17.3% 
1974 8.2% 18.6% 
1975 5.2% 20.6% 
Phase II (1975–1989) 
1980 3.2% 13.3% 
1981 -4.3% 11.5% 
1982 0.8% 12.8% 
Phase III (1990–2002) 
1989 3.2% 10.9% 
1990 -4.3% 10.6% 
1991 1.0% 10.8% 
Phase IV (2003–2014) 
2008 5.1% 17.8% 
2009 -0.1% 18.7% 
2010 7.5% 19.2% 
Note. Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
Phase I – Import substitution, industry inception, and its consolidation (1964-1974) 
 
Since the 1920s, cars have been imported and assembled in Brazil. However, due to the increasing 
burden of these imports on the balance of payments (from less than 5% of total Brazilian imports in 
1945 to more than 14% in 1952), the Kubitschek government (1956–1960) launched an ambitious 
automotive program aimed at manufacturing vehicles in Brazil (Shapiro, 1994). The government 
defined a series of incentives, such as fiscal benefits and advantageous conditions for importing capital 
goods (machines and equipment), to attract firms interested in investing in the country (Gattás, 1981). 
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As a result of these actions, several manufacturers arrived in Brazil, including Ford, General Motors, 
and Volkswagen. Over the following 18 years (1956–1974), production of vehicles increased from 
30,000 units in 1957 to 859,237 units in 1974 (ANFAVEA, 2016). Accordingly, the automotive 
industry’s share of industrial GDP in the country increased – it accounted for 13.82% in 1968, but 
reached 20.6% in 1975 (ANFAVEA, 2016).  
Much of the economic and industrial growth in this phase occurred during the period of military 
dictatorship, especially during the miracle years (1968–1973) when the country’s average annual 
economic growth was above 10%. This period coincided with the consolidation of the military regime, 
also known as the plumber years. The development of the automotive industry required investment in 
infrastructure, which was a favored target of the military governments (Fausto, 2000). The agreement 
and sharing of interests of the automotive industry and government, from the presidency of Juscelino 
Kubitschek to the military governments, represented a convergence (Roehe, 2011). As a consequence, 
both the country’s economy and the sector’s performance became closely interdependent.  
At this time (1968–1973), the economy as a whole and the automotive industry in particular 
started to feel the effects of the oil crisis, which had severely hit the world economy. A fourfold increase 
in the price of oil during 1973 and 1974 had a substantial impact on the balance of foreign trade, 
transforming the automotive industry from a growth lever into the Achilles heel of the country’s 
economic development. Such a situation required a revision of the rules of the game for the industry. 
While previous rules resulted from convergent interests of the government (to reduce the foreign trade 
deficit and leverage Brazilian industrialization) and industry (to increase their output), from the mid-
1970s their interests increasingly diverged. However, given government–industry interdependencies, 
the challenge was to redefine the existing rules of the game and create new ones that were equally 
convergent for both parties’ respective interests.  
Following the effects of the oil crisis, the government’s intention was to reduce fuel consumption, 
promote exports, and stimulate the development of new technologies aimed at reducing Brazil’s 
dependence on foreign oil. Given that the latter could be achieved only in the long term, the priority 
became the alteration of untenable production levels. However, limiting production meant breaking a 
taboo from the 1964 revolution. Although the government did not intend to shift its economic model 
based on developmentalism, and as it became clear that growth above 10% was no longer feasible, the 
government’s logic changed to constraining access to credit and dropping incentives. Mitigating the 
burden of oil imports was, however, a more challenging issue: vehicle exports were almost non-existent 
between 1957 and 1973, but they became a critical issue thereafter for both the government and industry 
as exports increased. In 1974, the industry exported 64,678 vehicles to 50 countries, 264% more than in 
1973, when it exported 24,506 (ANFAVEA, 2016). 
Like exports, technology became a major concern for the government when the sale of more 
powerful, high performance cars (leveraged by easy credit and cheaper oil) became untenable. From 
1974, the government demanded that smaller, more economical vehicles be manufactured. In addition, 
the oil crisis led the government to prioritize ethanol as an alternative fuel. Table 7 summarizes the main 
findings for Phase I. 
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Table 7 
 
Co-evolution Categories (Phase I) 
 
Political Context 
Military dictatorship  
Active role of the state in the economy 
Economic Context 
Higher economic growth  
Increasing importance of the automotive industry in 
industrial GDP 
Basis of exchange between  government 
and industry 
Government priority  
Production, instead of foreign trade and technology 
 
Industry priorities 
Advantageous conditions for implementing the industry 
Internal market 
Outcomes of industry–government 
exchange 
Increasing convergence of interests  
Rules of the game (production) 
Note. Source: The authors. 
 
Phase II – Alternative fuel and exports (1975-1989) 
 
In 1975, the automotive industry was responsible for 20.6% of total industrial GDP. As the 
automotive industry reached its peak GDP contribution, several issues emerged that affected the interests 
of the industry and government, which up until that time had converged. First, when oil prices 
skyrocketed, countries heavily dependent on oil imports, such as Brazil, witnessed a rapid increase in 
trade deficits. At that time, Brazil imported around 80% of the oil it needed. Thus, when prices increased 
10-fold within a few years in the 1970s, the military regime decided Brazil had to be less dependent on 
this fuel source. Second, in order to prevent inflation from escalating, the government limited credit and, 
hence, the financing of durable goods such as cars (Roehe, 2011). Oil price increases, high inflation, 
lower economic growth, and less credit affected domestic vehicle consumption, which fell sharply. In 
spite of the importance of the automotive industry to the country’s economy, the deepening of the 
economic crisis provided evidence that interests were gradually becoming irreconcilable. To no avail 
the industry made several demands to the government, including a reduction in vehicle taxes, which 
were among the highest in the world (30–35% of the final product price). The government argued that 
tax reduction was not consistent with the rigid fiscal policy followed at that time and it could not 
relinquish such an important source of revenue. As a result of the worsening macroeconomic scenario, 
Brazilian automotive industry production began to decline. In 1981, production output fell to its lowest 
level since the start of the automotive industry in 1956. However, the situation continued to worsen 
throughout the 1980s and by 1989, vehicle production was down 13% compared to a decade earlier. As 
a result, the automotive industry lost importance within the economy as a whole, and its share of 
industrial GDP decreased from 20.6% in 1975 to 10.9% in 1989 (ANFAVEA, 2016).  
Still within this period, issues that had not been as significant as in the Phase I, such as exports 
and technology, became priorities. The industry sought to increase exports to compensate for the decline 
of the internal market in Brazil. The government, in turn, needed foreign currency to service debt 
payments and pay for imports, especially oil (Anderson, 1999), which had gained importance in the 
balance of trade. The automotive industry played a central role within the government’s strategy to 
increase exports. A series of incentives was granted to the industry, including financing for production 
directed at exports, extending credit, and more favorable conditions for paying interest. From 1976 to 
1989, vehicle exports increased by 900%. While in 1970, the industry exported only 409 units, in 1988 
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exports amounted to 253,720 vehicles. In 1974, the share of total vehicle exports amounted to 7.1%, but 
by 1990, approximately 20.5% of total vehicle production was for foreign markets (ANFAVEA, 2016). 
In order to ease the heavy costs of oil imports, the search for an alternative fuel became a 
government priority. Ethanol was viewed as a way to reduce vulnerability and, thus, in 1975 the National 
Ethanol Program (Programa Nacional do Álcool [Próalcool]) was created. Heavily subsidized by the 
government and never particularly efficient or cost effective (Schneider, 2015), the program involved 
ministries, public research institutes, and institutions, such as ANFAVEA; the Cane, Sugar, and Ethanol 
Cooperative of São Paulo (Cooperativa de Cana, Acúcar e Álcool de São Paulo [Copersucar]); domestic 
sugar producers; and MNEs (mainly Volkswagen and Fiat). As a result of these concerted efforts, in 
1979 less than 1% of new registered vehicles were fueled by ethanol, but in 1985 this proportion 
amounted to almost 85% (ANFAVEA, 2016). 
As the economic crisis triggered by the oil crisis hit both the government and automotive industry, 
their interests became even more intertwined. Even though the government made decisions that were 
against the automotive industry’s interests, the government depended on the industry to increase exports 
and to develop and produce vehicles fueled by ethanol. The industry, in turn, depended on government 
(and its agencies, such as ministries and research institutes) to provide incentives to sugar cane producers 
and get consumers to buy alcohol-powered cars (Schneider, 2015), thus preventing greater damage. In 
contrast to the Phase I, instead of focusing simply on output and exports, new fuel technology became 
priorities for both players. Table 8 summarizes the main findings for Phase II.  
 
Table 8 
 
Co-evolution Categories (Phase II) 
 
Political Context Military dictatorship  
Economic Context 
Lower economic growth 
Oil shock (high cost of oil imports) 
High inflation  
 
Lower share of the automotive industry in industrial GDP 
Basis of exchange of government 
and industry 
Government priorities 
Price control 
Export promotion  
Development of alternative fuel technology 
Promotion of sugar and alcohol production 
 
Industry priorities 
Increase exports  
Compensate for the decline of the internal market in Brazil 
Respond to the government’s demand of developing engines that use 
alternative fuel 
Outcomes of industry–government 
exchange  
Lower and then higher degree of convergence of interests 
Rules of the game  
(foreign trade and technology) 
Note. Source: The authors. 
 
Phase III – Increasing competition and modernization (1990-2002) 
 
After 25 years of military rule (1964–1985) and a transitional period (1986–1989), Collor de 
Mello (1990–1992) was elected president of Brazil in 1989, but resigned in 1992 after corruption 
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charges. The vice-president, Itamar Franco (1992–1994), took power. Their radically different styles 
can be illustrated by the two following anecdotes, both related to the automotive industry. Collor de 
Mello famously compared Brazilian cars to horse wagons; Franco, an older and more traditional 
politician who was more associated with simplicity, suggested that Volkswagen should restart 
production of its famous Beetle, which it had stopped years before. Following the president’s suggestion, 
the German manufacturer restarted production of the Beetle. More than simply illustrating the individual 
government styles of the two presidents, these anecdotes highlight the value of cars within Brazilian 
society, the importance of the automotive industry to the country’s economy, and the close links between 
politics and industry.  
Even though the country had recovered political normality, from an economic viewpoint, the 
situation continued to be chaotic and inflation soared to levels not seen before. After a series of failed 
attempts to control inflation, in 1994 a successful economic stabilization plan (the Real Plan) brought 
inflation rates down to levels not experienced in more than a decade. In addition, other macroeconomic 
reforms were implemented, including trade liberalization, privatization, and the creation of Mercosur 
(the Southern Common Market of the South), an economic bloc composed of Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay. The adoption of these pro-market policies helped to leverage economic growth 
(1.95% on average per year between 1990 and 2002) and boost regional trade and investment flows.  
At the industry level, the automotive industry was far from being as important as in Phase I. In 
1990, the automotive sector only accounted for 10.6% of industrial GDP (ANFAVEA, 2016). The lower 
interdependence that resulted did not mean that the government and industry were no longer locked in. 
On the contrary, as previously stated, the collaborative nature of the relationship (Schneider, 2015) from 
its very beginning had set the basis for the subsequent relationship. As in the past, a series of fiscal 
incentives were granted to the industry.  
In response to the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, the new government sought to promote and 
modernize this industry through policies known as Industry Agreements (1992-1994) and the New 
Automotive Regime (1995-1999). These policies involved different actors, such as the government, 
labor unions, automotive industry, vehicle distributors, and auto motive parts providers. They were 
based on a shared view that industry production and sales had decreased significantly in the 1980s; that 
relationships across government, industry, and labor had become chronically poor; and that the Brazilian 
automotive industry was doomed to disappear due to the rapid modernization of the Japanese and 
Korean automotive industries. 
The first agreement, signed in 1992, comprised several aspects such as vehicle price reduction, 
stability of employment levels, and vehicle financing. The second, signed in 1993, focused on 
production, investment, redefinition of financing rules for the acquisition of buses and trucks, vehicle 
price reduction (tax and profit margin reductions), and salary increases. In addition, it offered tax 
incentives on vehicles with 1,000 cm3 engines (popular cars) that would be taxed at 0.1%. Finally, the 
third agreement, signed in 1995, focused on trade issues as imports had increased substantially following 
the creation of Mercosur.  
Later on, the government launched the New Automotive Regime (1995–1999), which aimed to 
modernize the industry, improve competitiveness, and foster investment by attracting foreign capital 
and increasing competition within the industry. As in the past, this regime adopted similar mechanisms 
(subsidies and trade barriers) to attract MNEs, such as import quotas, local content requirements, tax 
concessions (conditional on export performance), and incentives for MNEs that establish plants in less 
developed areas (Barros & Pedro, 2012; Consoni, 2004).  
Economic stabilization brought by the Real Plan, alongside industry agreements (1992-1994) and 
the New Automotive Regime (1995-1999), boosted car production, consumption, and imports. Total 
production of vehicles increased from 914,466 units in 1990, which was lower than 15 years earlier, to 
1,791,530 in 2002, although this was lower than a peak of 2,069,703 in 1997 before the Asian crisis. 
Thus, in contrast to the 1980s when production had stagnated, in the 1990s Brazilian automotive 
production boomed (ANFAVEA, 2016). Tax concessions for cars with 1,000 cm3 engines contributed 
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substantively to increased internal demand. The registration of cars with these engines increased sharply 
from less than 5% of total cars produced in 1990 to nearly 67% of the total in 2002. As a result, the 
industry again increased its share of Brazilian industrial GDP from 10.8% in 1990 to 12.9% in 2002, 
although this was far behind the highs reached in the mid-1970s.  
In foreign trade terms, two key events in that period – trade liberalization and the creation of 
Mercosur – substantially affected trade balances and the automotive industry (ANFAVEA, 2006). After 
a long period of closed markets, trade tariff reductions led to a substantial increase in car imports. 
Whereas in 1990, only 115 vehicles were imported, in 1995 the import volume reached 370,000 
vehicles, falling in 2002 to nearly 110,000 vehicles. Exports also increased – from 187,000 in 1991 to 
424,000 in 2002 – but not as much as imports. Another decisive factor in leveraging foreign trade was 
the creation of Mercosur: 64% of Brazilian exports were to countries in the common market – mainly 
Argentina, which alone received 75% of Brazil’s total vehicle exports to Mercosur (ANFAVEA, 2006).  
Both macroeconomic and industry shifts affected the dynamics and competitiveness of the 
automotive industry, the strategy of MNEs, and their R&D activities. Carmakers in Brazil had already 
modernized their industrial operations (change of quality, productivity, and competitiveness patterns), 
built new plants, and renewed their product portfolios. Because of government incentives, several other 
manufacturers arrived in Brazil (this was the third wave – the first being in the 1950s and the second in 
1970s). Even though the government established specific policies for the industry, which were 
successful in attracting foreign capital, the government disregarded mechanisms to stimulate and 
promote R&D (Schapiro, 2017). Incentives were primarily for the expansion of production capacity 
rather than the broadening of local technological abilities. Selling popular cars largely led to greater 
specialization of MNE subsidiaries in this segment and, hence, to carmakers’ strategies regarding new 
models (Consoni, 2004). In contrast to the 1980s, the share of ethanol-fueled cars decreased sharply in 
the 1990s. Whereas in 1985, nearly 85% of registered new vehicles were fueled by ethanol, in 1995 this 
proportion was less than 3% (ANFAVEA, 2016). Table 9 summarizes the main findings for Phase III. 
 
Table 9 
 
Co-evolution Categories (Phase III) 
 
Political Context 
Return of democracy 
More market-oriented governments 
Economic Context 
Economic stabilization 
Trade liberalization 
Privatization 
Creation of Mercosur 
 
Lower share of the automotive industry within industrial 
GDP  
Basis of exchange of government and 
industry 
Government priorities 
Modernization of the industry 
Increase competition  
Improve competitiveness  
Attract new MNEs 
Macroeconomic stabilization 
 
Continues 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Basis of exchange of government and 
industry 
Industry priorities 
Modernize products, plants, and production process 
Incentives (tax concessions) for “popular” cars  
Outcomes of industry–government 
exchange  
Increasing convergence of interests 
 
Rules of the game (foreign trade and production) 
Note. Source: The authors. 
 
Phase IV – Renewed focus on production (2003-2014) 
 
With a more favorable international economic scenario (higher demand and commodity  prices), 
Brazilian GDP growth averaged 3.85% between 2001 and 2012, in contrast to 2.54% and 1.57% in the 
1990s and 1980s, respectively (IBGE, n.d.). Under the Workers’ Party, “with its economic model of 
pumping up consumption through social welfare transfer, pay rises and increased access to credit” 
(Financial Times, 2013), the automotive industry boomed. Production almost doubled, increasing from 
1,827,791 units in 2003 to 3,172,750 units in 2014, making Brazil one of the largest vehicle 
manufacturers in the world in 2014 (the Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles 
[OICA], 2016). Accordingly, the share of the automotive industry in Brazilian industrial GDP increased 
again, from 12.5% in 2003 to 20.4% in 2014 – levels not seen since 1975. As well as their strategies, 
this increasing interdependence intertwined the fates of government and industry. However, this did not 
mean changes in the rules of the game regarding innovation. Instead, government regulation aimed to 
foster production and economic growth. 
To sustain this boom, a combination of tax reductions and credit easing was widely used to 
leverage sales and production – mainly after the global economic crisis in 2008, which had severely hit 
the automotive industry worldwide. In the aftermath of the crisis, to prevent sales from falling sharply, 
representatives of the automotive industry defended an aggressive policy of reducing interest rates in 
order to increase credit. The industry performed excellently after the government agreed to reduce taxes, 
operating at full capacity and planning a new investment cycle. As one of the CEOs of the main vehicle 
manufacturers claimed, the decision to continue to offer tax concessions demonstrated that the 
government was concerned about GDP. Moreover, the CEO added that the industry had much to 
contribute to the country’s economic output.  
Even though production increased substantially and Brazil ranked among the world’s major 
vehicle producers, the country was not among the top exporters. Furthermore, exports were quite 
irregular. In 2003, the industry exported 535,980 vehicles. Two years later, it sent 897,144 vehicles 
abroad. In 2012, however, the export volume fell to 472,046 units. In terms of production, the industry 
exported between 13.8% (2012) and 35.5% (2005) of total manufactured vehicles produced in the 
country. Some markets lost importance, such as the United States and European Union, whereas others, 
such as Argentina, alone accounted for more than 70% of Brazilian vehicle exports in 2011 (ANFAVEA, 
2016). 
Half a century after its creation, and in spite of its importance to the Brazilian economy, 
technology development in the industry did not yet become a government priority like in other countries. 
Even though high-ranking public authorities had stated that the government would stimulate the 
manufacturing of green vehicles, boosting sales to leverage economic growth and maintaining job levels 
seemed to be more important than technological innovation. Although the Brazilian automotive industry 
began to sell flexible-fuel cars in 2003, which was a major innovation and outcome, in terms of newer 
technologies such as hybrid, electric, and fuel-cell vehicles, the Brazilian industry still lags far behind 
the rest of the world (Olmos, 2013).  
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In 2012, the government launched a five-year program called the Incentive Program for 
Technological Innovation Incentive and Strengthening of the Motor Vehicle Production Chain (Inovar-
Auto). It aims was to attract new investments in order to increase the level of local content production, 
which would favor the auto parts industry. Increasing spending in engineering, industrial technology, 
and suppliers’ qualifications, as well as investment in R&D and the manufacturing of more economical, 
efficient, and safer vehicles, was seen as a way of reducing the technological gap between Brazil and 
developed countries (Castro, Barros, & Vaz, 2014; Schapiro, 2017). Here, the government looked to 
attract more investment, increase the competitiveness of vehicles manufactured in Brazil, foster local 
and regional (through Mercosur) manufacturing of automotive parts, and create more jobs. ANFAVEA 
estimated that the Inovar-Auto program would be responsible for nearly US$ 30 billion in investments 
made by the industry, including new plants and the expansion of existing ones. The outcomes of this 
program in terms of effective technology development have not, however, looked very promising. Even 
though opportunities within the automotive industry include the development of hybrid and electric 
vehicles, government incentives have broadly favored traditional vehicles (Schapiro, 2017). Table 10 
summarizes the main findings for Phase IV. 
 
Table 10 
 
Co-evolution Categories (Phase IV) 
 
Political Context 
Democracy 
Workers’ Party in power 
Economic Context 
Economic growth based on pumping up consumption 
Easing credit 
 
Greater share of the automotive industry in industrial GDP  
Basis of exchange of government and 
industry 
 
Government priorities 
Job creation 
Increase consumption 
Innovation 
 
Industry priorities 
Incentives 
Internal market 
Outcomes of industry–government 
exchange  
Higher degree of convergence of interests 
 
Rules of the game (production and innovation) 
Note. Source: The authors. 
 
 
Discussion  
 
 
Our research results suggest that the outcomes of exchanges (rules of the game) between 
government and industry strategies are highly contextual and dependent on political and economic 
conditions prevailing at a particular moment in time. As these rules changed following economic 
downturns and political shifts, they reflect the interdependence between the automotive sector and the 
country’s economy. Adopting North’s terms, the automotive industry and the Brazilian government 
have a symbiotic relationship, as do their fates. Six decades after the industry’s creation, the government 
has not succeeded in defining rules that effectively promote a more innovative industry. Instead, the 
Brazilian automotive industry, which is still highly dependent on government subsidies and protection, 
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seems to merely be a sticking-plaster solution to macroeconomic difficulties. Not surprisingly, 
interdependence is a key driver of the co-evolutionary process between government and industry 
strategies.  
When the Brazilian automotive industry was created in the mid-1950s, the government’s main 
objective was to reduce the country’s balance of payments deficit and drive Brazilian industrialization. 
Rules were defined to attract interested MNEs and, thus, accomplish these aims. The priority of the 
government was mainly production, and with this, imports would be reduced. From the 1950s to the 
1970s, industry and government strategies (economic growth and production growth) distinctively 
converged. This convergence led to more consensual rules of the game because they responded to the 
interests of both sides. This convergence also meant that the two players’ interests became closely 
intertwined and, thus, the fate of one depended on that of the other, creating a dependence that marked 
the posterior evolution of both sides’ strategies. 
In the mid-1970s, the oil crisis hit the industry, which in less than two decades had become a 
critical to the country’s industrial GDP. The government’s strategy was, on the one hand, to restrict 
internal consumption and, on the other, boost exports and the development of an alternative fuel. As the 
government could not continue stimulating internal consumption, it had to change the rules of the game, 
prioritizing exports and the development of ethanol. The automotive industry lost importance in overall 
industrial GDP and, compared to the previous phase, interest commonality was less evident. However, 
export increases and the solid development of ethanol were only made possible because of incentives 
provided by the government. Rules changed to prevent the automotive industry from contributing to the 
worsening of the economic crisis, and, then again, to foster its contribution to economic recovery.  
A political and ideological change in 1990, led by the first democratically elected government 
since 1962, meant reductions in heavy protectionism that had prevailed within the Brazilian economy. 
Changes in rules regarding imports (tariffs were reduced) showed the extent to which the Brazilian 
automotive industry required modernization. The convergence of interests between the industry and 
government was low, with rules on trade being imposed by the government. However, the modus 
operandi quickly shifted again: government-, labor union-, and industry-negotiated rules aimed to 
reduce vehicle prices, maintain employment levels, and increase production. Later, with the New 
Automotive Regime, other rules were defined that aimed to modernize the industry, increase 
competition and competitiveness, and foster investments. Despite changes in the way these rules were 
defined, consecutive governments never stopped granting incentives and protection to the industry. As 
a result, as the economy grew, the industry started to regain its past importance. Although during brief 
periods low endogeneity seemed to prevail, the process soon became highly endogenous again. 
From the 2000s, like that which had occurred in Phase I, with easing credit the government 
facilitated consumption. The rules regarding taxes were changed to boost sales and production. In so 
doing, government strategy leveraged the industry and increased economic growth. The industry became 
as important as in the mid-1970s and helped to accomplish government aims. However, the Inovar-Auto 
program was less successful in the promotion of radical innovations, a phenomenon already happening 
in this industry in other parts of the world. Overall, a higher degree of convergence of government and 
industry interests, resulting from the symbiotic relationship between the automotive industry and 
Brazilian economy, led to the definition of rules of the game that fostered production and – only – 
incremental innovations. There was a lower level of institutional endogeneity because the commonality 
of interests alongside interdependence led both actors into concerted and coordinated action. 
Overall, the economic and political contexts that prevailed, along with changes in the basis of 
exchanges, gave rise to the rules of the game that the industry responded to in accordance with its own 
interests. These rules, in turn, affected industry performance in all three categories (production, foreign 
sales, and technology). The emphasis on one of these dimensions depended on choices made by 
successive governments. Our findings suggest that Brazilian government strategies for the automotive 
industry in the periods analyzed predominantly addressed short-term economic and political challenges, 
giving rise to an industry primarily focused on boosting vehicle production – and occasionally on 
restricting imports or fostering exports, not because of its vocation, but to resolve trade unbalances. 
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There was little concern for innovation and sustainability, except during Phase II, when the industry was 
involved in the development of ethanol-fueled engines. The kind of industry that took shape in Brazil 
certainly resulted from a degree of interest convergence between the industry and government, but also 
from the economic and political challenges relevant to each period of our analysis.  
Table 11 presents a summary of our findings for the entire period under analysis. For the 
automotive industry, the rules of the game varied in incentives and constraints. In all periods except the 
1980s, the industry displayed much dependence on the government and its provision of credit for 
consumption, market protection, and subsidies. It seems that the government considered the industry 
primarily as a tool to increase consumption and, therefore, to boost economic activities. This 
interdependence drove the co-evolution process between government and industry strategies. Although 
interdependence varied, as well as the direction and content of rules, the close relationship between both 
sides allowed rapid implementation of policy priorities (Schneider, 2015), particularly in the aftermath 
of the worst economic years. 
 
Table 11 
 
Co-evolution Factors during the Four Analysis Periods 
 
 1964–1974 1975–1989 1990–2002 2003–2014 
Political and 
economic 
context 
Military coup 
Miracle years 
Oil shock 
Military governments 
Lost decade 
Economic instability 
High inflation 
Return of democracy 
Trade liberalization 
Creation of Mercosur 
Economic stabilization and 
privatization  
Workers’ Party in 
power 
Easing credit 
Facilitating 
consumption  
Basis 
of exchange 
of  
government 
and industry 
High degree of 
interest 
convergence   
Highly 
interdependent 
 
 
Government 
emphasis on exports 
 Development of 
ethanol as a  
technological 
solution 
Less protection by the 
government 
Government interested in 
increasing competition 
(arrival of new 
competitors) 
Industry sought to 
increasingly modernize its 
products and production 
processes 
Government interest 
in industry’s role in 
boosting 
consumption and 
exports 
Firms interested in 
government tax 
concession 
Rules of the 
game 
Attraction of 
MNEs 
Production-
oriented rules 
Restrictions on 
vehicles imports 
Abundant credit 
Incentives for the 
industry 
Incentives for 
exporting 
New alternatives for 
gas 
Price control 
Restrictions on profit 
remittance 
 
Reduction of trade tariffs 
Attraction of new MNEs 
Tripartite agreements 
Tax incentives for popular 
cars 
 Automotive regime 
(subsidies, trade barriers, 
import quotas, local 
content requirements, tax 
benefits, and other 
incentives) 
Tax reductions (still 
one of highest in the 
world) and 
facilitation of 
consumers’ access to 
credit  
New program for the 
automotive industry 
(Inovar-Auto) aimed 
at increasing 
investment in R&D 
and innovation 
Continues 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
 1964–1974 1975–1989 1990–2002 2003–2014 
Industry 
performance 
Increasing share 
of the industry in 
industrial GDP  
Less exporting 
Little investment 
in technology 
development 
Lower share of the 
industry in industrial 
GDP 
Substantial increase 
in vehicle exports 
Sales of ethanol-
fueled vehicles 
amounted to 85% of 
total 
Industry GDP share  
started increasing again 
Increased number of car 
assemblers 
Production of popular cars 
boomed 
Increased sales to 
Mercosur 
Sales of ethanol-fueled 
vehicles amounted to less 
than 5% 
Industry share of 
industrial GDP at 
mid-1970s levels   
 Brazilian industry 
ranked one of the 
largest in the world 
Investment in hybrid 
vehicles 
 
 
Note. Source: Compiled by the authors. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
By tracing the evolution of the automotive industry in Brazil, this research has primarily aimed 
to comprehend the co-evolution between industry strategies and government policies. To this end, we 
investigated the drivers and outcomes of this co-evolution. Specifically, we examined the basis of 
exchanges between the government and industry as well as how this shaped the rules of the game – 
policies applied to the industry. Drawing on North’s (1990) argument that institutions are created to 
serve the interests of those with the bargaining power to devise new rules, our research has shown, first, 
that institutions are appropriately viewed in these contexts as endogenous – they are interest driven and 
therefore shaped by the priorities of  industries and governments; second, interdependence and economic 
and political circumstances influence the direction and content of the rules of the game, which are 
defined by the government for the industry. These rules may be defined primarily to resolve 
macroeconomic difficulties. Third, the role of interdependence in institution-building should be seen 
conjointly with path dependence. As mentioned by North (1990), institutional incentive structures 
provided by government determine how the rules of the game evolve and change.  
Figure 1 summarizes our findings, which could be refined with further research. The rules of the 
game are developed from economic and political contexts and types of exchange between government 
and industry. These rules shape industry strategies on production, technology, and foreign trade. 
 
 
Figure 1. Co-evolution between Context, Interest-based Exchange, Rules of the Game, Industry 
Strategies, and Interdependencies 
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A major theoretical contribution of this study is that it refines our understanding of the rules of 
the game, particularly their construction and change over time. Instead of being the result of rational 
government choices, the rules of the game arise from interdependencies between them and different 
economic sectors. A co-evolution perspective assumes that economic entities influence each other, but 
only recently has the political nature of this influence been analyzed (Child et al., 2013). This view of 
co-evolution has brought attention to the relevance of concepts from political science (such as power, 
influence, interests, and ideology) in disentangling its dynamics. As our study shows, changes in the 
nature of interdependencies and exchanges between those who make and legitimize the rules and those 
who shape them are the root of the dynamics of co-evolution. Our study also suggests that 
interdependencies between industry and the whole economy vary over time and can affect the direction 
as well as the content of the rules of the game.  
Another theoretical implication, derived from our refined understanding of the types of exchanges 
(give and take) within co-evolution processes, concerns the role of institutional endogeneity (Dieleman 
& Sachs, 2008) in understanding the dynamics of co-evolution in emerging economies. Dieleman and 
Sachs’ (2008) main argument is that organizations can modify their environments to fit their needs 
through political connections. The case of the Brazilian automotive industry shows that endogeneity 
increases when the interests of industries and governments become coincidental and intertwined. Put 
differently, as the accomplishment of government interests depends on satisfying industries’ interests, 
the rules of the game assume a more endogenous character. As Dieleman and Sachs (2008) insightfully 
contend, if it is true that institutions should be seen as endogenous as they can be influenced by the 
political action of organizations, circumstantial interdependence is another variable that can explain 
institutional endogeneity. 
This study has some limitations. The first relates to the challenge of covering such a complex 
industry over a long period of time. There were several economic and political shifts throughout the 
decades and these have multiple implications for the automotive industry. We focused on data regarding 
production, external trade, and technology; however, we acknowledge that for the dynamics of co-
evolution between industries and governments to be fully unveiled, the analysis of other data categories 
is required. Second, due to the impossibility of analyzing all articles on the theme published over 50 
years, we chose those articles that appeared in the worst economic year (in terms of economic growth) 
of each period. We do not ignore the shortcomings of our choice as the dynamics of co-evolution was 
subjected to events that occurred in years that were not analyzed in this paper. Nevertheless, we believe 
that this study presents topics for further research that need to be addressed. One suggestion is to 
compare the dynamics of co-evolution between the automotive industry and government with other 
institutional settings. Another suggestion is to analyze co-evolution in other industries. Both would help 
to further illuminate the role of politics and power in co-evolutionary processes as well as political action 
in the definition of, and changes to, the rules of the game.  
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